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CASTING LIGHT ON CULTURAL PROPERTY 
John J. Costonis* 
PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES. By Joseph L. Sax. Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press. 1999. Pp. xiv, 245. $32.50. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Theorists of private property invite comparison to theorists of 
light. 
For centuries, the latter have debated whether light is best under­
stood as a wave or as a photon. The rivalry has been intense because 
each hypothesis explains some characteristics of light very well, but 
others very poorly. Wave theory outstrips photon theory in explaining 
such phenomena as light's frequencies and diffraction patterns. But 
photon theory, which reduces light to a succession of particles, more 
effectively explains such subatomic phenomena as changes in an 
atom's orbital shell produced by the interaction of photons and elec­
trons. 
Property theorists too can be viewed as occupying different posi­
tions on a spectrum. On one end are those supporting a conception of 
property as a self-contained and bounded photon; on the other, those 
favoring a model of property as a wave registering, indeed incorpo­
rating, the tensions and values of the social ether through which the 
wave moves. 
A. Property as Photon 
The property-as-photon model undergirds United States Supreme 
Court opinions labeling as "per se takings" public restrictions that li­
cense a permanent physical occupation of private property or that de­
prive the owner of its entire economic value. These opinions deem 
irrelevant the public purposes underlying these restrictions - the so­
cial "ether," if you will, within which they are intended to function. 
Like a self-contained photon, private property stands separate and 
apart from its claimed links to larger social purposes. Uncompensated 
incursions upon it are deemed per se takings, no matter how compel­
ling the governmental purpose or, in the case of permanent physical 
* Chancellor, Louisiana State University Law Center. A.B. 1959, Harvard University; 
J.D. 1965, Columbia University. - Ed. 
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occupations, how marginal the encroachment. These opinions, 
moreover, tend to identify the "property" in question as much with 
the physical entity itself (typically real estate) as with the relations the 
physical entity bears to its owner and to the community beyond. 
The two leading per se takings opinions illustrate these features. 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Company,1 a permanent 
physical occupation case, examined a New York statute that author­
ized cable television companies to install 4"x 4"x 4" control boxes atop 
New York City apartment buildings without securing their owners' 
permission. The statute's purpose was to facilitate the diffusion of ca­
ble TV's educational and social benefits by reducing viewer costs that 
had been inflated by fees charged by building owners for the space 
atop their roofs.2 
Whether or not the public interest in increasing viewer access 
should prevail over the owners' claim is certainly debatable. But the 
Court's per se rule prevented the question from being raised at all. 
Distressed that the cable companies' "property" (their cable boxes) 
would be affixed, unconsented, to the building owner's "property" 
(the space atop the building), the Court confined its analysis to an 
evaluation of the character of the physical encroachment alone.3 Pre­
dictably, it concluded that the statute's grant of uncompensated access 
violated the Fifth Amendment's takings ban.4 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,5 a total economic depri­
vation case, likewise focused on a public restriction's impact on private 
property while proscribing inquiry into the consequences beyond a 
landowner's lot lines of his exercise of dominion over his property. As 
defined by the South Carolina legislature, the restriction sought, 
among other purposes, to prevent coastal erosion by barring construc­
tion within a prescribed distance from a shoreward line.6 To be effec­
tive, such programs must address regulated areas as comprehensive 
ecological networks - such as shorelines, basins, or estuaries - not as 
discrete ownership parcels isolated from these networks. 
The coastal plan, which placed Lucas's two lots in the non­
buildable shoreward zone, was comprehensive. But it failed to pro­
vide him with a financial offset for the total loss of development rights 
that its comprehensiveness dictated. For the Court, the loss of these 
1. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
2 See id. at 425. 
3. See id. at 439, 441. 
4. See id. at 441. The Fifth Amendment states, "[n]o person shall . . .  be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for pub­
lic use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
5. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
6. See id. at 1007-09. 
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rights alone determined Lucas's outcome. Unless the restriction in­
heres in the owner's title by virtue of the state's prior property or nui­
sance principles, reasoned Justice Scalia in his majority opinion, the 
statute's public purposes must be ignored in the takings calculus.7 
This is property-as-photon theory with a double vengeance. It seg­
regates individual private lots from their inclusion in larger ecological 
units. It also dismisses from the takings calculus consideration of the 
off-site community advantages these restrictions are designed to serve. 
The photon model, like that of light, explains, or at least rational­
izes, a variety of issues associated with its subject. One is the structure 
of the Fifth Amendment's syntax that "private property [may not] be 
taken for public use."8 The Amendment's independent treatment of 
the terms "property" and "public use" arguably supports the view that 
an owner's proprietary interest is not diminished by the "publicness" 
of the property in question.9 On the contrary, the text could be read 
to reflect that the more "public" the benefits conferred on the larger 
community by the contested private property restrictions, the stronger 
the claim that these restrictions require compensation as a matter of 
constitutional right.10 
The model also comports with the common understanding that 
property implicates autonomy and personality values as well as eco­
nomic values. Autonomy fits hand in glove with the conception of 
property as a barrier against, not as an opening for, state curtailment 
of the owner's dominion. As William Pitt declared long ago: 
[t]he poorest man in his cottage may bid defiance to all the forces of the 
Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; 
the storm may enter it; but the King of England cannot enter it! All his 
power dares not cross the threshold of that ruined tenement!11 
The property-as-photon model is further distinguished by its roots 
in, and congruence with, the preference of America's mixed economic 
system for private ordering absent evident market failure or injury to 
others stemming from proprietor primacy. This preference derives 
from a wariness of public regulations imposed in the name of commu­
nitarian values. Its adherents, which include many of the last quarter 
century's law and economics and public choice scholars, believe that 
the private marketplace is typically the most efficient resource alloca­
tor and that private ordering best safeguards individual freedom by 
7. See id. at 1027-28. 
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
9. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). 
10. See Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077 (1993). 
11. CHAUNCEY A. GOODRICH, SELECT BRITISH ELOQUENCE 65 (1870). 
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linking property and personality.12 Some even believe they have the 
mathematical equations to prove these contentions. 
Paralleling the communitarians' fear of market failure, is the pho­
ton theorists' obsession with government failure. Their reasoning is 
familiar. Government may regulate inefficiently or inequitably due to 
insufficient information, excessive administrative costs, or simply, in­
ept management. Values masquerading as communitarian are often 
those of private factions more astute at manipulating the political pro­
cess than are their adversaries or an indifferent or acquiescent public 
in whose name these values are asserted. 
Photon model adherents also question legislators' capacity to an­
ticipate or describe the activities a particular measure seeks to regu­
late with sufficient precision to achieve the purposes at hand or to 
cabin the risks associated with the strategic behavior of factions or, for 
that matter, of governmental officials themselves. They believe that 
dangers of such governmental failure outweigh the risk that a private 
ordering system may overlook goals valued by elites or, perhaps, by 
many others in the community. 
The property-as-photon model reinforces the private ordering 
preference in multiple ways. It warns that public regulation that too 
easily dismisses the preference may fail in a system in which the insti­
tution of property remains solidly linked to private initiative despite 
government's increasing role as a creator and regulator of wealth. The 
private sector may eschew or obscure from governmental attention the 
creation, ownership, preservation or donation of property valued by 
the public if government shifts to itself the owner's proprietary enti­
tlements. The model, which is premised on the wide diffusion of 
property and property owners throughout the private sector, also ex­
plains why high administrative and enforcement costs inevitably ac­
company governmental efforts to regulate property or its owners.13 
The model also rationalizes a legal regime that invests presumptive 
dominion over property with its private owner, and allows this pre­
sumption to be overridden only if government can justify the regula­
tion under its police or eminent domain powers. The presumption 
favors the economic interest of individual property owners, of course. 
No less important to adherents of private ordering, it also hinders the 
imposition of these controls by requiring government to generate po­
litical support for the exercise of either power and, in the case of the 
eminent domain power, to drain the public treasury as well. 
12 See W. Van Alstyne, The Recrudescence of Property Rights as the Foremost Principle 
of Civil Liberties: The First Decade of the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Summer 1980, at 66 (discussing the revival of legal interest in how property protects non­
economic values). 
13. See Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfield, Compensation for Takings: An Eco­
nomic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569 (1984). 
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B. Property as Wave 
Property's wave theorists portray the bounds of proprietary enti­
tlement as dependent in any given context upon the clash of pertinent 
social and proprietor interests.14 Theirs is a secular, not a sacred, con­
ception of property rights, which they are more inclined to view as ex­
pectations subject to diminution by superceding public interests. Illus­
trative of this viewpoint, and worthy of contrast with the United States 
Constitution's Fifth Amendment, is Article 42(2) of the Italian Consti­
tution, which, under the title of "Property" states: 
Private ownership is recognized and guaranteed by laws which prescribe 
the manner in which it may be acquired and enjoyed and its limitations, 
with the object of ensuring its social function and of rendering it accessible 
to all.15 
Unlike the Fifth Amendment, Article 42(2) expressly validates the 
"social function" of property ownership as an intrinsic limitation on 
private dominion. 
In consequence, the wave model reinforces many of the political 
and social constraints that its theorists believe should cabin proprietor 
entitlements. Chief among them is the subordination of proprietor 
entitlements to communitarian values in those instances in which pri­
vate enjoyment of the property in question is deemed offensive to 
these societal values.16 
This starting point implies a variety of corollaries. The wealth and 
autonomy expectations of individual proprietors receive less solicitude 
under the wave model, which supports more ample scope for govern­
ment's police power and a less generous takings calculus for severe 
intrusions on proprietary values. The model is likewise distrustful of 
private ordering and the marketplace when competing public values 
are at stake. Wave theorists do not assume that individual private 
choice or the aggregation of wealth- or autonomy-biased preferences 
will honor these values. They believe instead that the public interest 
in such cases will more likely be vindicated by a public participatory 
process in which the perspectives not only of proprietors, but of other 
groups with a stake in the impacted community values, are taken into 
account.17 
14. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the 
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1688 {1988). 
15. See Costituzione [CONSTITUTION][ITALY] art. 42{2) (emphasis added). 
16. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Takings and the Post-Modern Dialectic of Property, 
9 CONST. COMMENTARY 259 {1992). 
17. The work of Joseph Singer, starting from Hohfeld's insights, in viewing property as 
social relations, is prominent here. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in 
Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 751 (1988). 
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Necessarily, therefore, wave theorists must subscribe (or, at least, 
claim to subscribe) to a view of public process and government over­
sight demanding a level of optimism that photon theorists are inclined 
to view as naive, inefficient, or worse. For example, in establishing a 
property-limiting regime, government must have the capability to 
identify values that truly are communitarian, rather than simple ag­
gregations of the preferences of elites and other groups eager to ma­
nipulate the political process for private ends. It must formulate stan­
dards and procedures that are accurately targeted to the program's 
needs, parsimonious of private or public resources, and immune to 
capture by these factions. Finally, it must at least acknowledge prop­
erty's root entitlements, however more malleably defined under the 
wave model. Otherwise, the program may not withstand legal chal­
lenge. Even if it does, it may prove unworkable as a practical matter 
in those instances in which private initiative and private dominion are 
essential ingredients for the program's success. 
The differences between the photon and wave models of property 
and the efforts of the models' respective champions to extol the vir­
tues of one over the other have largely defined the battleground for 
property scholars over the last half century, if not before. There have 
been occasional forays seeking to bridge the gap both in theory and in 
practice between the two models. As one who has shattered lances in 
assaults on this windmill,18 I have become increasingly doubtful that, 
on the theoretical level at least, accommodation can be achieved. In 
their opposition, the legal and more important economic and political 
starting points of the two approaches rise to a level as contentious as 
the beliefs of warring religious cults. 
Yet life goes on, takings jurisprudence shifts but marginally toward 
one or the other model (and sometimes both simultaneously), and the 
nation's political economy retains its centrist cast. The reasons for this 
tense but undeniable equilibrium are undoubtedly many and complex, 
but helpful clues to important dimensions of the apparent paradox can 
be found in Professor Joseph L. Sax's Playing Darts with a Rembrandt: 
Public and Private Rights in Cultural Treasures.19 
On its face, Playing Darts seems an unlikely venue for these clues, 
and Professor Sax an unlikely author to reveal them. Playing Darts 
seeks to make the case for an Italianate "social function" in privately 
owned property imbued with cultural significance. It de-sacrilizes 
property ownership by demoting it to "just a fact," asking "what con­
sequences should follow from such facts, where there is some signifi­
cant public stake on the other side," and responding with a thesis 
18. See John J. Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Anti­
dotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 15 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1975). 
19. Joseph L. Sax is a Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley. 
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calling for "recognition of a species of qualified ownership founded on 
the recognition that some objects ... are constituent of a community, 
and that ordinary private dominion over them insufficiently accounts 
for the community's rightful stake in them" (pp. 36, 37, 197). 
More broadly, Playing Darts is but the latest installment of a dis­
tinguished and prolific body of scholarship extending over more than 
four decades in which Professor Sax has established himself as the na­
tion's most thoughtful and articulate property-as-wave theorist.20 One 
might anticipate that Playing Darts would present a scorching indict­
ment of the property-as-photon model because the latter embraces the 
"conventional notions of ownership" which Sax condemns as offensive 
to the community's cultural heritage (p. 9). 
Paradoxically, this reader left Playing Darts with greater respect 
for private dominion. Under Sax's own account, private ownership 
and private ordering prove so essential to the creation and preserva­
tion of this heritage that the actual reforms Sax proposes are far 
milder than dogmatic commitment to this "qualified property" thesis 
would suggest. 
Playing Darts also engages Sax's view of the entitlement of the 
community and its chroniclers to access information embedded in 
heritage artifacts and sites - his version of the public's right to know 
about and participate in its cultural heritage. Sax reasons as though 
this view were an integral element of his private dominion inquiry. 
Partially, it is an integral element when private dominion, as conven­
tionally understood, impedes the community's access or preservation 
interests. It is also an integral element in Sax's responding proposal of 
shifting dominion entitlements to government to secure these inter­
ests. 
But conflating the two issues is misplaced in two contexts, the dis­
cussion of which consumes a substantial portion of the volume. The 
first embraces such cultural resources as archeological sites that are 
originally owned by public agencies, not private individuals. Sax's dis­
cussion of these resources targets the extent to which governmental 
schemes allocating public access to them respect the public's right to 
know (pp. 153-96). 
The second embodies privately owned cultural resources - princi­
pally the papers of notable governmental and private figures - that 
either devolve to private sector successors or are donated to museums, 
libraries, and similar public depositories. Sax's target, again, is not 
private owner entitlements - which, in fact, he leaves essentially un-
20. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Heritage Preservation as a Public Duty: The Abbe Gregoire 
and the Origins of an Idea, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1142 {1990); Joseph L. Sax, The Legitimacy of 
Collective Values: The Case of the Public Lands, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 537 {1985); Joseph L. 
Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE LJ. 149 {1971); Joseph L. Sax, 
Taking and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 {1964) [hereinafter Sax, Taking]. 
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disturbed - but the practices or professional codes of recipient mu­
seums, libraries, and executors or successors that frustrate the public's 
right to know.21 
Sax's conflation of these issues is problematic because his treat­
ment of the public's right to know supports two conclusions that run 
counter to his generally unsympathetic view of private dominion. The 
first, which appears in examples where dominion is publicly held, is 
that government may be no more protective of public access than may 
private owners. The second, which is reflected in instances when pri­
vate dominion remains undisturbed, is that private dominion may ei­
ther be preferable to public control, particularly when privacy values 
are at stake, or it may be the sole practical alternative, however 
threatening to public values. 
Photon theorists would applaud both conclusions. 
II. PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT 
Playing Darts commences with Sax's statement of the problem: 
"[m]any of the greatest artifacts of our civilization can be owned by 
anyone who has the money to buy them, or the luck to find them, and 
their owners can then treat the objects however their fancy or their 
eccentricity dictates" (p. 1). Hence the volume's arresting title. The 
category of artifacts selected for discussion in the succeeding chapters 
includes paintings and other exemplars of fine art; architecture; the 
papers of American presidents, of United States Supreme Court jus­
tices, and of artists, writers and other private notables; and objects of 
paleontological or archeological distinction. 
Sax's examples are as provocative and culturally informed as they 
are apt. They horrify, intrigue, educate, and, for many readers un­
doubtedly, persuade. The balance of this Part utilizes selected exam­
ples to recount the book's property rights and right-to-know themes, 
stopping here and there to quibble or to lay a basis for the apprecia­
tion of Playing Darts offered in the essay's final section. 
A. Fine Art 
A Diego Rivera mural for the Rockefeller Center's RCA Building 
serves to test the issue whether patrons may be precluded from de­
stroying or altering art that they own or have commissioned. The 
Rockefellers elected to raze the mural, which embarrassed them with 
its likeness of Lenin and celebration of communist themes. Sax agrees 
21. Sax devotes Chapters Five through Nine to these subjects. See pp. 60-150. An ex­
ample of such a professional code is ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGE AND RESEARCH LIBRARY, 
STANDARDS FOR ETHICAL CONDUCT FOR RARE BOOK, MANUSCRIPT, AND SPECIAL 
COLLECTIONS LIBRARIANS {2d ed. 1994). See p. 120. 
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with those who deemed the razing an act of cultural vandalism (p. 18), 
and proposes a legal regime in which the public's interest in the pres­
ervation of fine art should override its patron's entitlement to destroy 
or alter it (pp. 21-34). 
He comments favorably on a California statute22 that rearranges 
property entitlements in this manner by going beyond the artist's droit 
moral, first, to locate a distinguishable preservation interest in the 
public, and second, to obligate the disenchanted owner to provide the 
artist or public prior notice so that the work of art can be removed and 
protected. Chicago's Daley Plaza Picasso sculpture and Manhattan's 
Richard Serra Tilted Arc are featured in a related discussion in which 
Sax opposes artists' claims that their works must be retained indefi­
nitely in the outdoor setting for which they were commissioned de­
spite the public's opposition to these works (pp. 26-32). 
A Graham Sutherland portrait of Winston Churchill, commis­
sioned by Parliament as a gift to the aging Prime Minister, and 
Georges Rouault's torching of 315 of his own incomplete paintings are 
among the examples employed by Sax to explore whether private do­
minion should be diminished to prevent owner/subjects like Churchill 
or self-critical artists like Rouault from concealing or destroying fine 
art (pp. 37-42, 43). Churchill and his wife detested the painting, which 
they never displayed in his lifetime and which she burned before his 
death. Rouault destroyed his own works because he feared he would 
be unable to complete them to his satisfaction. 
Sax would rearrange property rights in the Churchill situation, 
aligning them to withdraw the owner-subject's entitlement to deny 
public access to or destroy the painting. In Sax's calculus, the fact that 
Churchill was both owner and subject while Rockefeller, in the previ­
ous example, was owner alone does not outweigh the public's preser­
vation interest. He would allow disgruntled patron/subjects (and, in 
the Churchill example, spouses of patrons as well) to embargo the 
painting during their lifetimes, but require public display of the pre­
served painting at some non-remote period following the subject's 
death (p. 41). 
Sax approves Rouault's action, asserting that the entitlement of a 
creator "to implement his own judgment about what is worthy of him" 
outweighs the evident value of the destroyed material to the public 
and to the historians and critics who broker the public's right to know 
(p. 42). I am puzzled by Sax's line drawing. So long as artists are free 
to display what they regard as their best work, why should not what 
they regard as their lesser work also be subject to Sax's cultural heri­
tage claim in view of its undeniable value in enhancing public under­
standing of the work they prize? The "lesser" work, moreover, may 
22. California Art Preservation Act, CAL. CrvIL CODE § 987 (West 1999). 
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be received as the "greater" by present or future audiences since, as 
Sax constantly reminds us, the judgment of history is often at odds 
with that of self-interested parties (p. 201). Tolstoy, for example, con­
demned his prior writing as worthless following his spiritual transfor­
mation. Should he have been free to destroy the manuscript of War 
and Peace if it had been written, but not published, prior to this expe­
rience? 
B. Architecture 
Controversies triggered by proposed additions to Louis Kahn's 
Salk Institute in La Jolla, California, and McKim, Meade and White's 
Grand Central Terminal in Manhattan are featured in Sax's treatment 
of great architecture. In the preservationists' view, a new building 
proposed for the Salk complex, which did not enjoy protected land­
mark status, ought to have been distanced from the complex rather 
than integrated into it. In Manhattan, the 55-story modern office 
tower proposed by Marcel Breuer as an addition atop the Beaux Arts 
Grand Central Terminal was dismissed as an "aesthetic joke" by the 
New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission (p. 56). The 
Salk addition was built. But New York City's denial of a permit for 
the Breuer tower resulted in the United States Supreme Court opin­
ion, Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York.23 
The architecture chapter differs from those preceding it because 
Sax's thesis favoring qualified ownership for cultural heritage property 
is well-established in the landmark/urban design field, albeit more re­
cently for non-landmarked structures than for those subject to such 
regimes. Its novelty for this reviewer is Sax's effort to address the 
"seeming paradox" that, "unlike an ordinary owner of an ordinary 
building, [the landmark owner] bears a special burden as his reward 
for having endowed us with a magnificent structure" (p. 55). 
The paradox was the centerpiece of Justice Rehnquist's dissent to 
Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Penn Central sustaining the 
city's uncompensated ban of the Terminal tower. Sax criticizes Justice 
Brennan's reasoning for its question-begging merger of landmark 
regulation with more conventional forms of land use regulation (p. 
57). A restriction from which particular property owners suffer under 
the latter is premised either on a harm the restriction seeks to prevent 
or some benefit deriving from the restriction and mutually enjoyed by 
this and other owners impacted by the restriction. But neither condi­
tion would apply to a tower-topped Grand Central Terminal. Its im­
pact on its environs would be no more or less harmful than that of 
fully developed properties nearby. Under the landmark ban, moreo-
23. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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ver, Penn Central was not itself the beneficiary of restrictions applying 
to other properties and itself as members of a regulated class. Instead, 
Penn Central had been singled out to provide a community benefit at 
enormous cost to itself, a result that clashes with the harm/benefit ra­
tionale. 
Sax, one would think, should have little trouble with Justice 
Brennan's reasoning. It fits effortlessly with Playing Darts' thesis that 
owners of cultural heritage property are stewards whose dominion is 
limited by conditions safeguarding the property's heritage values. The 
plight of being singled out for burdens on dominion is shared, after all, 
by owners of every legally constrained category of cultural property 
reviewed in Playing Darts, all of whom confer an unreciprocated bene­
fit on the community by bearing these burdens. 
Even more to the point, Sax advocated rejection of the 
harm/benefit rule in a 1964 article24 that Justice Brennan expressly 
cited in support of his rejection of the rule.25 Surprisingly, Sax feels it 
necessary to go further, settling the landmark owner's duty on the 
"impact on others generated by an individual's choice to engage crea­
tors and to take dominion over potent cultural icons ... " (p. 58; empha­
sis added). But why the need to go beyond the phrase "impact on 
others," which is more than adequate to satisfy Sax's qualified prop­
erty thesis? The italicized language strikes me as rubbing salt into the 
dominion wound by turning the owner's choice against himself - as­
suming, indeed, that it were possible for owners to know that the 
buildings they are commissioning or purchasing will eventually be 
designated as landmarks. 
C. Collectors' Duties 
Collectors of fine paintings, sculptures, and other cultural artifacts, 
Sax observes, usually treasure their art and maintain it in excellent 
condition (p. 64). Many see themselves as stewards, self-obligated to 
protect the art and even to loan it out for public viewing from time to 
time. Were all collectors similarly inclined, Sax would eschew a for­
mal legal regime mandating periodic display of their master works. 
Not all collectors, however, are so inclined. 
Take the case of the bizarre Albert Barnes and his collection of 
2,000 of the greatest French post-Beaux Arts paintings (including the 
finest collection of Renoir works anywhere). The outrage and hostil­
ity greeting the 1920s display at another museum of 94 of his then­
avant garde paintings so soured him on the orthodox art establishment 
that he thereafter embargoed access of a group so large that it in-
24. See Sax, Taking, supra note 20, at 48-50. 
25. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133 n.30. 
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eluded "all persons whose education and work could have [given 
them] serious reasons for wishing to visit it."26 
With the Barnes story in mind, Sax proposes obligating collectors 
to participate in an expense-compensated loan program in which their 
collections are periodically displayed for public view. Selection of the 
master works would be made by a committee of experts under the 
auspices of the National Gallery of Art or a similar institution. Once 
listed, the work would be subject to obligatory display at an appropri­
ate national venue for a limited duration once or twice per generation. 
The national museum would be charged with all costs and responsibili­
ties associated with the loan (p. 67). 
Whether coherent, confinable standards can be defined for the 
broad range of cultural properties Playing Darts canvasses is highly 
doubtful. These doubts contribute to my belief that, independently of 
proprietary issues, control over many categories of these properties is 
best relegated to private ordering. Perhaps an exception is appropri­
ate for fine paintings and sculptures because many that are cherished 
by the public are relatively easy to identify. But I would caution 
against the exception absent tight criteria strictly limiting selection on 
the basis of the number of entries, their minimum age, resource cate­
gory, and of other conditions insuring appropriate citizen input and 
the qualifications of the selection panel. These criteria are obviously 
crude and underinclusive; many contemporary paintings and sculp­
tures, for example, would be worthy of inscription as would works un­
known to the public at large. Enlarging the class, however, creates an 
unacceptable risk of losing control of the process, which would likely 
kill adoption of the process in the first place. I would also be fearful 
that disturbing private ownership and its autonomy entitlements in 
this fashion might unsettle the current private ordering system, which, 
with all its warts, has been reasonably effective both in securing the 
display of privately owned works and in eventually shifting ownership 
of many of the best works to the museums themselves. 
D. Paper Trails 
Playing Darts' chapters that address the papers of American presi­
dents (ch. 6) and Supreme Court justices (ch. 7), and the control of the 
papers and other materials of notable private figures by heirs, biogra­
phers and scholars (ch. 9), merit joint treatment. Of the three classes 
of property, Sax would rearrange dominion entitlements only over 
presidential papers, as Congress did in 1978 when it shifted ownership 
26. Pp. 74-75. Here Sax quotes Pierre Cabanne. 
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of the papers after the Nixon presidency from the incumbent to the 
federal government.27 
Even photon theorists, I believe, would support this shift in view of 
the undeniably public nature of the resource and the limited and iden­
tifiable membership of the regulated class. Surely, something is wrong 
when incumbent presidents must apply to the libraries of their prede­
cessors to obtain crucial documents linked to ongoing matters of state, 
as President Ford was obliged to do in seeking a record of the negotia­
tions conducted by President Nixon with Chinese leaders. Grating, as 
well, is the contrast Sax portrays between the public stewardship that 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry Truman displayed and the contrary 
stance of Richard Nixon's representatives in demanding tens of mil­
lions of dollars as compensation for a congressional directive that 
shifted control of his papers to the General Services Administration 
(pp. 84-88). 
Sax finds no truly satisfactory resolution of the clash between pub­
lic disclosure and institutional or personal prerogatives regarding the 
other two classes of papers. Frustration dogs his thoughtful effort to 
balance the public's right to know with insulation of the Supreme 
Court's internal processes from improper public disclosure. The jus­
tices themselves are unable to define a common position acknowl­
edging the historical value of their papers (p. 201 ). Some justices, 
Hugo Black among them, condemn any disclosure, while others, in­
cluding Thurgood Marshall, openly court it. Congress and Sax both 
decline to shackle the justices with formal rules akin to those of the 
Presidential Records Act transferring the papers' dominion to public 
depositories (p. 116). Because there is no even playing field for schol­
ars and journalists, a favored few prosper while the others languish, 
and the public is kept waiting for biographies and other studies that 
appear decades later if, indeed, they appear at all. 
Similarly troubled is the picture regarding access to the papers of 
private figures, but here, Sax tells us, the value impeding the public's 
right to know shifts from protecting confidentiality of institutional 
processes to safeguarding the privacy and sensitivities of these figures 
or their families. Although Sax states that "the claims of history out­
weigh those of family feeling," he ultimately declines to propose 
shifting dominion from the papers' custodians to the public (p. 198). 
He proposes instead that families and executors commit to an ethic 
subordinating protection of the family hearth and its confidences to 
service as stewards of a cultural resource (pp. 138-42, 198). 
27. See PRESIDENTIAL RECORDS ACT, 44 U.S.C.A. § 2203 (1996) ("[T)he President 
shall take all such steps as may be necessary to assure that the activities, deliberations, deci­
sions, and policies that reflect the performance of his constitutional, statutory, or other offi­
cial or ceremonial duties are . . .  maintained . . .  pursuant to the requirements of this sec­
tion . . . .  "). 
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But Sax is adamant that "[w]hatever sensitivity is appropriate to 
accommodate family feeling needs first to be separated from impera­
tives uttered in the name of proprietary rights" (p. 198). I would sub­
mit, however, that the claims of history are overridden not simply out 
of deference to family sensitivities, as Sax ultimately concludes, but 
because a formal legal rule favoring history's claims over private do­
minion is simply not an option given the inherent nature of the prop­
erty in question. 
Unlike land, which is visible, inventoried in government registries, 
and the subject of public scrutiny through all manner of regulatory 
limits on its use, private papers typically are shielded from public view, 
uninventoried and uninventoriable, and free of regulation in no small 
part because of both characteristics. Ownership of these papers, 
moreover, is widely diffused throughout society. Since owner self­
registration of these papers is not a realistic option, how would gov­
ernment begin to get a handle on where these papers are, who owns 
them, and what they contain? Even if it could, would the intrusiveness 
of the requisite effort be acceptable in a free society? 
A related question suggesting that proprietary rights may not be so 
easily discounted is whether what Sax terms the family's "privacy" in­
terest is not actually rooted in private property's autonomy value. Re­
call Sax's own definition of autonomy as a "claim of entitlement to 
decide the fate of an object" (p. 9). This, of course, is precisely the 
claim that these papers' owners are asserting and that, under the "pri­
vacy" label, Sax finds persuasive. Relevant as well (but deferred for 
later discussion) is the non-property problem associated with the im­
possibility in the private papers context of defining standards of cul­
tural and historic value with sufficient clarity to exclude virtually any­
thing that this or that elite views as exhibiting this value. One or more 
of the foregoing concerns, one can assume, accounts for Congress's 
refusal to extend the protections of the Presidential Records Act be­
yond the confined sphere of the papers of the nation's presidents 
alone. 
E. Dead Sea Scrolls, Publication Rights, and Access to Library and 
Museum Collections 
While issues clustered around private dominion are a principal 
concern of Playing Darts, the volume devotes substantial attention to 
the manner in which governments and other public entities allocate 
access to culturally significant objects and sites. Exploration of this 
issue occurs in the chapters addressing the Dead Sea Scrolls (ch. 10), 
publication rights (ch. 11 ), and the practices of museums and libraries 
in dealing with donor-restricted materials (ch. 8). 
The controversy surrounding the Dead Sea Scrolls, one of the most 
dramatic archeological discoveries in human history, presents "in its 
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purest (and least attractive) form the issue of scholarly access to re­
search materials," according to Sax (p. 158). And a scandalous story it 
is because the Jordanian and Israeli governments, as successor­
owners/custodians of this find, granted exclusive investigative rights to 
the Scrolls to a research team whose administration of their charge 
violated the most fundamental postulates of open scholarship. The 
four decades following the find witnessed warfare over translation and 
publishing rights, unconscionable delays in the Scrolls' processing and 
publication, unwillingness of the team to share information beyond 
other team members and their graduate students, and the delayed dis­
closure of information of cardinal importance to biblical scholarship.28 
Aside from chronicling the ensuing frustration of the public's right to 
know, the chapter introduces the archeologists' convention known as a 
"publication right," which Sax defines as "a scholarly convention 
[that] gives the researcher who is assigned to publish a text complete 
control over it for an indefinite period" (p. 164). 
In a linked chapter entitled "The Privatization of Scholarly Re­
search," Sax explores the pros and cons of the publication rights con­
vention and its source in government-permitting schemes for archeo­
logical sites under which the team selected for the excavation receives 
the exclusive right to publish its findings (pp. 165-78). Libraries and 
museums holding papyrological resources engage in similar practices 
when they assign favored scholars like rights to particular documents. 
Sax is troubled by this "privatization" of access because the practice is 
vulnerable to the varied abuses detailed in the Dead Sea Scrolls chap­
ter. To these he adds arrangements blocking the access of other 
scholars to materials even after the favored scholar has published 
findings concerning them (pp. 176-78). 
Sax's commitment to the public's right to know reappears in his 
critique of the access-denying practices of libraries and museums, par­
ticularly as they derive from restrictions imposed by donors as a condi­
tion of gifting their cultural artifacts to these institutions. Singled out 
for intense criticism are post-publication embargoes, exclusivity ar­
rangements and other filters that deny scholars and the public they 
serve an even playing field, embargoes exceeding periods reasonably 
designed to ensure the privacy and privilege interests of persons refer­
enced in the donor's collection, and access limitations permitting ad­
ministrators to pick and choose among access applicants. Sax warns 
that these devices undermine the community's participation in its cul­
tural heritage when placed in the hanc;ls of competing biographers, 
protective relatives, curators with their own research agendas, and 
28. For various accounts of the Dead Sea Scrolls history, see FRANK CROSS, THE 
ANCIENT LIBRARY OF QUMRAN (3d ed. 1995); LAWRENCE H. SCHIFFMAN, RECLAIMING 
THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS (1994); JAMES VANDERKAM, THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS TODAY 
(1994). 
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others who are disinclined "to let history make its own judgments" (p. 
201 ). These concerns gain credibility in Sax's account of the manner 
in which the family of C.G. Jung and the acolytes of Sigmund Freud 
manipulated access to Library of Congress collections of the Jung and 
Freud papers to prevent unflattering portrayals of both (pp. 122-23, 
128-33). 
Readers unfamiliar with the practices of governments, libraries, 
and museums detailed in these three chapters will learn a great deal, 
much of it disturbing. They will also be impressed with Sax's probing, 
contextually nuanced arguments on behalf of the public's right to 
know, or of letting "history make its own judgments" (p. 201) unfet­
tered by the access-distorting practices he details. Moreover, these 
chapters are fascinating reading. Whether exposing the academic 
scandals associated with the Dead Sea Scrolls research team or the 
Freud papers debacle at the Library of Congress, Sax engages the 
reader with graceful writing, cultural literacy, and dramatically apt 
examples. 
The chapters also invite two observations adverted to earlier in this 
Review. First, they demonstrate that the answer to the cultural heri­
tage issues Playing Darts poses does not reduce simply to shifting do­
minion entitlements from the private to the public sector. Govern­
ment failure, as the Dead Sea Scrolls scandal illustrates, is no less a 
problem in this field than in any other regulatory sphere. Second, 
these chapters reveal how effectively property ownership's inherent 
characteristics constrain the extent to which private entitlements can 
be discounted in the effort to secure public access to cultural artifacts. 
Sax's chapter on access to library and museum collections, for ex­
ample, seethes with his abhorrence of access-distorting donor restric­
tions "made under the aegis of proprietary right" (p. 121 ). Yet his re­
form proposals slide around this right, as they do in his treatment of 
private papers of culturally influential figures, and focus instead on the 
adoption by institutions of a common set of rules designed to discour­
age the more egregious of the donor restrictions (pp. 126, 128). Sax 
understands, it seems clear, how utterly unworkable and impractical 
would be an effort to collectivize cultural heritage efforts by seeking, 
for example, to compel an across-the-board transfer to government of 
dominion over privately owned artifacts or to deny owners the enti­
tlement to impose access-restricting conditions on their voluntary 
transfers. 
F. Antiquities 
Playing Darts closes its inventory of cultural artifacts with a chap­
ter on antiquities, defined as culturally significant objects found in or 
under the soil of private sites (pp. 179-96). Demonstrating top form as 
one of the nation's premier land use theoreticians, Sax probes the pri-
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vate/public dominion issue in antiquities by contrasting case studies 
featuring "Sue" the Tyrannosaurus Rex (a fossil found in South Da­
kota), and the Chauvet Cave, a Southwest France treasure containing 
the oldest cave drawings yet found in Europe. Sax's ideal would be an 
antiquities regime that protects the scientific value of the object, pre­
vents destructive excavation, allows for appropriate research before 
the object is removed, provides assurance that future research oppor­
tunities will not be lost, and features an eminent domain valuation rule 
that excludes values from compensation awards associated with the 
object's cultural significance (pp. 193-94). 
Sue enjoyed none of these protections because none are afforded 
in the United States for fossils or any other antiquities buried in pri­
vate sites. In consequence, one of the most complete and best articu­
lated skeletons of its type became simply another object of commerce, 
its preservation and availability for study subject to the vicissitudes of 
the marketplace. Happily, the story ends well because Sotheby's auc­
tioned the fossil off for $8.36 million to the Chicago Field Museum of 
Natural History in an arrangement underwritten by private corpora­
tions.29 
The legal protections afforded the Chauvet Cave under French law 
are closer to Sax's ideal. France does not claim state ownership of an­
tiquities and must compensate owners for their acquisition. But it ef­
fectively shifts the value of these antiquities to the state by granting 
owners excavation permits only on terms fixed by the state. Under its 
legislation, France sealed the Chauvet Cave off for preservation and 
scientific investigation. It declared the cave a historic monument, 
which had the effect not only of preserving the site but of burdening 
the cave with a public servitude coextensive with the cave's paleon­
tological significance. The French government subsequently acquired 
the site outright in a condemnation proceeding that fixed compensa­
tion on the basis of the acquired property's current use rather than on 
the basis of the vastly inflated values attributable to the cave's cultural 
status or the tourist income it could be expected to generate (pp. 186-
93). 
Similar antiquities protection regimes for private sites could be es­
tablished as police power measures in this nation, I believe, without 
running afoul of existing Fifth Amendment constraints, provided that 
the residual value of the site, as measured by its current or permitted 
uses, would not be severely diminished. Penn Central, for example, 
concluded that the tower ban imposed on the Grand Central Terminal 
was not a taking even though the tower's value was capitalized in the 
$57 million dollar range. But the Supreme Court ignored this huge 
opportunity cost in favor of a finding that the landmark restriction left 
29. See Malcolm W. Browne, Tyrannosaur Skeleton ls Sold To A Museum For $8.36 
Million, N.Y. nMES, Oct. 5, 1997, at Sec.l p.37. 
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undisturbed the income potential the property enjoyed in its current 
use as a railroad terminal incorporating supplemental commercial ac­
tivities.30 
Less clear is whether or not the Fifth Amendment would counte­
nance eminent domain awards that exclude values associated with the 
site's cultural significance, as occurred in the Chauvet Cave example. 
In the United States, these awards are premised principally on the 
property's so-called highest and best use, a measure that, depending 
on the situation at hand, might be deemed to include values associated 
with the site's cultural stature.31 Professor Sax implicitly resolves this 
issue earlier in his volume when he rejects the claim that government 
ought to rely upon its eminent domain power to achieve the volume's 
proposed cultural heritage goals. His response: 
[t]he issues raised in the following pages, however, are intended to pose a 
prior question: what powers and responsibilities should be recognized in 
the owners of such objects in the first instance? . . . Such issues are not 
resolved by recognition of the government's power to expropriate such 
interests if they exist. They are questions about the relation that ought to 
exist between certain things that are physically capable of exclusive own­
ership and control and the larger community's claim upon them. [p. 9; 
first emphasis added] 
If the courts were to agree with Sax that "in the first instance," owners 
of antiquity-laden sites are burdened by a public servitude, there 
would be no need for government to compensate owners for these 
values because it would be purchasing something that it already owns 
as trustee for the community. 
III. PLAYING DARTS: AN APPRECIATION 
Three decades ago, Professor Sax sought to enlarge protection of 
the natural environment by premising citizen lawsuits on the thesis 
that, as fiduciary of a public trust, government was legally obligated to 
administer its property on behalf of the public, the beneficiary of this 
trust.32 Today, his vision has broadened to encompass the cultural en­
vironment and the private sector with the more sweeping thesis that 
private owners of culturally significant resources should be obligated 
to administer their property as stewards or custodians of the public 
interest. 
Sax extols a model of the private property owner as "the responsi­
ble collector who does not destroy and who does not conceal his 
treasures"; and as one of a group of like individuals who are "only 
30. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 129. 
31. See Costonis, supra note 18, at 1038-45. 
32 See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, 68 MICH. L. 
REV. 471 (1970). 
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temporary custodians"; and who "see themselves as the bearers of 
some special responsibility that transcends indulgence of their own 
fancies" (p. 201). What Sax declares of owners of great architecture 
- they are "not just owners, but custodians"33 - he holds for owners 
of all classes of culturally significant property. This construct, Sax ob­
serves, "remains the law's awkward little secret" (p. 59). His volume 
strives not only to disclose the secret, but to secure its recognition as a 
legal principle as influential for private dominion as his public trust 
thesis has been for public dominion. 
His private stewardship claim is as much reflective of the direction 
in which the law may actually be developing as it is advocacy of a 
novel point of view, an observation that applies as well to his earlier 
public trust thesis. Playing Darts, in fact, understates this develop­
ment in its claim that "the dominant modern idea of ownership is un­
derstood as entitlement to possess an object as an exclusively private 
thing, devoid of any public element except a broad obligation to avoid 
doing conventional harm such as trespassing on the territory of oth­
ers" (p. 3). In truth, the public dimension of private ownership 
throughout the last half-century has been magnified well beyond this 
photon-like characterization. The point is quickly confirmed by con­
sulting digests of legislation or decisions in the fields of historic pres­
ervation and urban design, endangered species protection, and, more 
broadly, the entire body of environmental law as it has developed 
since the late 1960s. 
The conceptual thorn pressing against Sax's thesis has been the 
rule encountered in the earlier Penn Central discussion that allows 
government to reduce private property entitlements to prevent harm, 
but not to compel a benefit. Strictly applied, the harm/benefit rule 
would overwhelm his thesis because no clearer example of a com­
pelled benefit can be imagined than government's singling out owners 
to share their culturally significant property with the general public. 
Despite its intuitive appeal and earlier influence, the rule has been 
weakened by assaults in the literature, including Sax's own work,34 and 
its uncertain standing in the courts, as evidenced by Penn Central it­
self.35 We can be certain that the rule is in trouble when even Justice 
Scalia, the high priest of photon theory,36 joins in trashing it.37 
33. P. 59. (citing Herbert Muschamp, Critic's Notebook: Art and Science Politely Dis­
agree on an Architectural Jewel's Fate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1992, at Cll). 
34. See Sax, Taking, supra note 20, at 48-50; see also Frank I. Michelman, Property, Util­
ity, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1196-201 (1967). 
35. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24. 
36. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (Scalia, J.); 
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (Scalia, J.). 
37. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020-26. 
1856 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 98:1837 
Although conceptually distinct from his private trust reasoning, 
Sax's argument favoring the public's right to know about and partici­
pate in its cultural heritage will also facilitate his thesis's acceptance. 
The argument taps into a powerful trend dating back to the "citizen 
participation" movement, which developed as a backlash to abuses of 
urban renewal programs a half-century ago. Over the last thirty years 
of environmentalism, this movement, aided by Sax's generalship, has 
witnessed the emergence of public interest organizations as a potent 
force in public policymaking of federal and state environmental im­
pact requirements, and of legislation empowering citizens to challenge 
government-sanctioned development proposals in administrative and 
judicial proceedings. Cultural heritage values, with historic preserva­
tion at the prow, have been a major beneficiary of these innovations. 
Then, of course, there is Playing Darts' emotional appeal. Who, 
but a Visigoth, or perhaps a law and economics or public choice cult­
ist, could possibly oppose a thesis that promises safe haven not only 
for the various cultural gems noted earlier but, to select randomly 
from Sax's fecund inventory, Da Vinci's Codex Hammer; Renoir's Au 
Moulin de la Galette; Frank Lloyd Wright's Guggenheim Museum; 
Stonehenge; Homo Erectus (Java Man); an undisclosed notebook of 
T.S. Eliot's poems; a manuscript of D.H. Lawrence's Sons and Lovers; 
and the papers of Franz Kafka, FDR, Sylvia Plath, James Joyce, and 
Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter? 
A brilliant theorist, Sax is also passionate in his beliefs and very, 
very shrewd in his advocacy. He understands that his thesis will not 
carry unless he can convince us, first, that there truly is a "community" 
out there united by consensus values and, second, that standards of 
cultural significance for varied categories of privately owned cultural 
property can be defined that are accurate, confinable, and, what may 
be the same thing, administrable. How better to create the impression 
that neither claim is problematic than to scour the last 30,000 years of 
human history and prehistory for properties that have become indis­
putable icons of West European and American culture? 
Although Sax's argument is likely to enjoy significant legal, politi­
cal, and emotional support, I expect that its success will nonetheless be 
mixed. The obstacles to its practical implementation are obscured by 
the simplicity of the theoretical construct on which it is premised. Cer­
tain of these obstacles go beyond administrative complications, 
moreover, and contest the construct's de-sacrilization of private own­
ership. In tiptoeing past them, Sax reasons as if the cogency of the 
theoretical construct is unrelated to its capacity for implementation, 
and vice-versa. 
My sense that Playing Darts promises more than it can deliver is 
sharpened by the evident disparity between the boldness of its thesis 
and the modesty of its proposed reforms. So wide is the gap that I am 
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led to wonder if Sax's modesty reflects his own silent discounting of 
his bold thesis in anticipation of these obstacles. 
Playing Darts' two chapters dealing with the Dead Sea Scrolls (ch. 
10) and publication rights (ch. 11) are not truly relevant to his private 
property thesis because they target government's allocation of access 
to property it owns or controls. To like effect is Playing Darts' treat­
ment of the papers of Supreme Court justices; access to library and 
museum collections; and heirs, biographers, and scholars (pp. 93-133). 
These chapters do engage property that is, or once was, in private 
ownership, but Sax never challenges this ownership. He neither com­
pels private owners to preserve and to provide access to their treasures 
(as he does owners of fine art) nor deprives private donors of the enti­
tlement to condition access to their collections in any (constitutional) 
manner they please. His choices are the less intrusive, if quite admi­
rable ones, of urging owners to manage their property pursuant to an 
ethic of stewardship, and urging museums and libraries to join collec­
tively in accords that discourage donors from imposing access limita­
tions on their gifts of private property. 
Sax's two chapters on the preservation of great architecture (ch. 4) 
and presidential papers (ch. 6) make object lessons of legal develop­
ments that have already matured, rather than pursue novel directions. 
Historic preservation has been a familiar planning tool since the 1930s, 
even if the Supreme Court did not get around to its validation until 
1978. The regulation of distingliished, but non-landmarked gems is a 
later development, but the land use codes of cities sophisticated in the 
urban design arts routinely address these properties as well. Post­
Nixon Presidential papers have been in public ownership since 1978, 
when Congress adopted the Presidential Records Act. 
The chapters on fine art (chs. 1-5) and antiquities (ch. 12), on the 
other hand, do call for a rearrangement of property rights. The for­
mer withdraws from owners the rights to destroy or mutilate fine art 
(pp. 13-34) and to deny access to it (pp. 60-80); the latter withdraws 
the right to destructive excavation and denial of access to the antiq­
uity, and, in cases of eminent domain, to a valuation rule that includes 
monetary values linked to the object's cultural significance (pp. 179-
96). 
But even in these instances, Sax treads on private dominion as 
lightly as possible. Murals may be removed, provided their artists are 
given prior notice and the opportunity to remove them (pp. 32-34). 
Portraits need not be shown during the lifetime of their (offended) 
subjects and for a reasonable time thereafter, provided that they are 
made available for periodic public viewing after this time (p. 41). 
Obligatory loans of fine art to public institutions should be employed 
only as "a matter of last resort," at no expense, and with as little in­
convenience as possible to their collectors (p. 67). Owners of land 
containing antiquities or discoverers of the latter should receive a 
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"substantial reward" and the former should be allowed to sell the an­
tiquity if its sale does not imperil the public's interest in the "ideas, 
information, or inspiration embodied within" it (p. 195). 
Why does Sax apply his "qualified property" thesis in such muted 
fashion? I would propose three reasons. First, Playing Darts pursues 
multiple targets, only one of which seeks the immediate reformulation 
of private property rights, and the attention of the foregoing chapters 
is distributed among these targets. Second, an unfortunate conse­
quence of Sax's decision "not . . .  to enunciate a set of rules, but rather 
to draw attention to issues . . . and to illustrate the common themes 
they display" is the diversion of his attention from the implementation 
obstacles adverted to above (p. 197). Finally, too aggressive an effort 
by Sax to de-sacrilize property, as his thesis seems to demand, would 
prove both infeasible and counterproductive. 
Commencing with the first of these reasons, Sax adds to his prop­
erty rights concerns the formulation of a pre-legal ethic of reverence 
for the cultural environment and an assault on the varied impediments 
to community access to and participation in this environment. With 
respect to the former, Sax seeks to do for the cultural environment 
what Aldo Leopold attempted for the natural environment when, in A 
Sand County Almanac, he preached a land ethic.38 Sax, an evangelist 
no less than a lawyer, understands that ideas do have consequences, 
one of the most potent of which is to prepare the ground for their 
eventual passage from ethical to legal stature. It is Playing Darts' 
strength, not its weakness, that it seeks to inculcate this ethic into what 
are largely private ordering arrangements at the present time. Sax's 
hope, one suspects, is that this ethic, like Leopold's land ethic, will 
progressively bleed into the legislation and constitutional jurispru­
dence of a later day. This Review's earlier discussion of Sax's com­
mitment to the public's right to know - the latter of his additions -
reveals not only the depth of his passion for this value but the exten­
sive treatment that it receives throughout Playing Darts. 
Moving to the second reason, Sax's theoretical focus causes him to 
avoid, rather than confront, the genuine difficulties posed by his 
premises regarding "community" values and coherent and confinable 
standards of cultural significance. Not surprisingly, these are the very 
premises, along with Sax's diminution of private dominion, that will 
most rile photon theorists. But even those who, like myself, place 
themselves toward the center of the wave/photon spectrum have rea­
son to be disappointed with the manner in which Sax's silence has the 
unseemly effect of stacking the deck to his advantage. 
Playing Darts's world often appears to be one in which every 
painting is a Rembrandt, every fossil Homo Erectus, and every author 
38. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (1966). 
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James Joyce. If that were so, validating community values or defining 
standards of cultural significance would be simple tasks. Indeed, se­
lecting icons satisfying both requirements is simple if the selection is 
done ex post from an inventory dating back to prehistory and compre­
hending every cultural artifact imaginable. 
But that's not how the process would work with respect to many, if 
not most, of the categories of cultural property named in Playing 
Darts. Determinations of cultural significance would more often have 
to be made ex ante, long before the object has ripened into an icon or 
its creator into an artist or architect enjoying consensus status as a 
master among the elite or the general public. To take only one exam­
ple of a figure whose paintings or private papers would likely be cul­
tural artifacts for Playing Darts' purposes, Renoir was unacceptable to 
the Beaux Arts establishment during his lifetime and for an indeter­
minate period thereafter. Witness the reaction to Albert Barnes's 
1923 exhibition at the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts.39 
Sax's confidence that governmental processes can enable "history 
[to] make its own judgments," thereby curing the shortsightedness and 
bias of the cultural property's "mere proprietors," borders on the 
grandiose (p. 201). In fact, it is Sax himself who observes that a "pri­
mary value" of the private collector "is the very presence of individual 
and eccentric, often advanced, tastes that would never be reflected in 
(indeed is all too often rejected by) official canons of selection or pro­
priety," (p. 60; emphasis added) and who inquires "why should one 
expect any special wisdom from a city council or any other collection 
of public worthies?" (p. 52). Why indeed? Despite the foregoing quo­
tations, a recurring problem with Playing Darts is its inclination to ad­
vance its case by confusing governmental chambers with the salon of 
Gertrude Stein and public administrators and community activists 
with her erudite habitues. My experience with the kind of public over­
sight Sax envisages is that however useful as a ritual for community 
venting, it affords scant assurance that the judgment of history will 
either be divined or respected. Not infrequently, what occurs instead 
is the creation of spurious history, as evidenced by adobe shopping 
centers in Santa Fe or the designation of the most banal or architec­
turally scrambled of neighborhoods as "historic" districts. 
The "community" to which Sax appeals may be solidly behind the 
preservation of Leonardo Da Vinci's Codex Hammer or Freud's pa­
pers. But what about the works of history's countless scientists, artists, 
and authors of lesser import that are more likely to be the subject of 
the public processes he advocates. It must also be admitted that these 
"communities" are often simply cultural elites who, like the architec­
tural critics who opposed the Salk Institute addition, align themselves 
39. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
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with heritage activists and purport to speak for the public. Let us ac­
cept that mandarins' voices should be regarded as proxy for the vox 
populi, at least when the actual public is acquiescent or indifferent, or 
in those rare cases when the cultural artifact in issue is indisputably an 
icon. Who speaks for the "community," however, if a cultural re­
source divides various groups as occurs, for example, when the in­
flated values associated with a neighborhood's historic district desig­
nation drive out its low-income population?40 
My objection is not that Sax fails to answer these questions persua­
sively, but that he avoids addressing them at all. As a result, we lose 
the benefit of the contributions he might offer toward their resolution. 
In addition, his silence leads him to overstate the extent to which 
"[c]onventional notions of ownership and dominion" impede cultural 
preservation (p. 197). 
Entitlement allocations certainly do enter into the picture. But 
they are by no means the whole story. Even if they were as malleable 
as Sax would like - and Penn Central suggests substantial movement 
in this direction - wholesale regulation of a number of the categories 
of privately owned property discussed in Playing Darts would likely 
not be preferable to the current private ordering alternative as long as 
these questions remain open. My exceptions would be architecture, 
antiquities, and perhaps, obligatory loans of fine art. Although not 
without standard-setting issues of their own, these categories may be 
more amenable than other types of cultural property to public permit­
ting regimes featuring acceptably coherent and precise standards. 
The final reason for the shortfall between Sax's ambitious thesis 
and quite modest proposals for reform returns us to this Review's in­
troductory claim. Playing Darts may help us to understand why tak­
ings jurisprudence and property regimes move within very narrow 
margins despite the theoretical chasm dividing wave and photon prop­
erty theorists. Paradoxically, Sax's effort to dispense with private do­
minion as a constraint on cultural preservation ends up demonstrating 
not only that private entitlements are indispensable to preservation's 
success, but that disregarding their pervasive presence is both infeasi­
ble and counterproductive. 
Let us use Playing Darts as our text for the homily. Sax opens the 
volume by acknowledging that "[f]or the most part it is neither practi­
cal nor appropriate that [cultural heritage objects] be publicly owned" 
(p. 9). Subsequently, he cites various grounds for the proposition that 
40. Virtually the only point at which Sax expressly addresses the issues of "community" 
raised in the text is in Chapter I, note 4, where he discusses the "Kennewick Man," an an­
cient human skeleton of a Native American, that Native Americans wish to bury and scien­
tists wish to study. Sax disclaims that it is his intent to "suggest there is a single, monolithic 
community." P. 203. But his claim is belied by his subsequent practice of identifying the 
values of the "community" with those he himself intuits as most in keeping with the goal of 
securing cultural heritage protection. 
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the private collector "is crucial to the protection" of these objects (p. 
60). 
Cultural innovation is one ground. A "primary value" of private 
participation, Sax comments, "is the very presence of individual and 
eccentric, often advanced, tastes that would never be reflected in (in­
deed is all too often rejected by) official canons of selection or propri­
ety" (p. 60). The "stewardship tradition" nurtured by private collec­
tors is a second ground (p. 72). It receives Sax's praise as "obviously 
powerful and deeply rooted . . . impressively it grows out of self­
imposed restraint, not as a duty imposed by law or even the strictures 
of public opinion" (p. 72). Stocking the culture's libraries and muse­
ums with great art, and its cities with great architecture is a third. In 
his appreciation of private collectors, Sax stresses that "through their 
philanthropy . . .  many, perhaps most, of the greatest works eventually 
find their way into public institutions" (p. 201). His discussion of great 
architecture likewise acknowledges that owners of these gems "bear[] 
a special burden as [their] reward for having endowed us with . . .  
magnificent structure[ s ]" (p. 55). 
A fourth ground is the preemptive weight Sax accords a value he 
describes as "privacy," but which often seems indistinguishable from 
familiar sticks in the property bundle. illustrative is his conclusion 
that owners of distinctive private homes should not be compelled to 
open them to public view because "privacy militates against legally 
compelled openings to the public" (p. 68). William Pitt would rush to 
exclaim, however, that "privacy" in this context is deeply rooted in, if 
not one and the same as, the right to exclude, certainly one of the pro­
prietor's most precious entitlements.41 To like effect is Sax's support 
for the artist's or writer's entitlement to order the destruction of his 
work, no matter how culturally momentous. At one point Sax de­
scribes the value being protected as the creator's entitlement "to im­
plement his own judgment about what is worthy of him" (p. 42). But 
is not this value congruent with the autonomy interest in property, 
which Sax himself defines elsewhere as a "claim of entitlement to de­
cide the fate of an object" (p. 9)? 
Deference to pro-dominion values appears in two other guises that 
receive attention in earlier paragraphs of this Review. One, seen in 
the discussion of private papers of notable figures, is Sax's choice in 
particular contexts not to shift proprietor entitlements to government, 
even though they impede or bar the public's right to participate 
knowledgeably in its cultural heritage. The other is his restriction of 
property rights to the minimum necessary in those instances when he 
believes some rearrangement is advisable. 
41. See supra note 11  and accompanying text. 
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Are these pro-dominion features mere gestures advanced by a 
shrewd wave theorist to minimize opposition to a radical rearrange­
ment of property rights? Perhaps Sax thinks so, but I do not. I believe 
that they reveal instead that property rights are not so easily secular­
ized, and, if barred at the door, may nonetheless find their way back in 
through the window, albeit garbed as pragmatic accommodation 
rather than as constitutional command. Sax understands that if he 
pushes his qualified property thesis too hard, his efforts will be coun­
terproductive. Among a litany of drawbacks, collectors may cease to 
collect42 or donate their treasures to museums (p. 69). Patrons may 
move their art to other jurisdictions (p. 66). Finders may discontinue 
their exploration for fossils or other antiquities, or vandalize these ar­
tifacts (pp. 195-96). 
The upshot of these observations can be summed up in alternative 
ways. One, which continues the de-sacrilization of private property as 
a mere "fact," is to acknowledge that this "fact" has major functional 
implications that must be respected in any inquiry into how and 
whether cultural property will be created, made accessible to the pub­
lic, and preserved in the United States. The second is to conclude that 
private property's functional importance explains why it has been sac­
rilized over the course of the development of Anglo-American prop­
erty and why it has been singled out for special status by the Constitu­
tion's framers. 
Whichever alternative is chosen, the reader leaves Playing Darts 
with confidence that the theoretical gaps dividing wave and photon 
property scholars will largely be filtered out in the practical conduct of 
cultural preservation. All that is lacking to test the question is a com­
panion volume on the topic composed by a photon scholar. Theoreti­
cal rhetoric aside, how different would its basic prescriptions be from 
Sax's own? Would it have any greater success discounting the evident 
realities of culture and community than Sax has had in de-sacrilizing 
property? Would its predisposition to private ordering not have to 
yield from time to time to recognition that the collective action de­
manded to achieve some forms of imperatively valuable cultural pres­
ervation simply cannot be achieved without a governmental assist? 
Finally, would it recognize that, despite their formal elegance, systems, 
in the end, make fools uf us all? 
42. See text supra following note 26 for a discussion of the related reluctance to display. 
